

THE NEXT GULF

*London, Washington and the
Oil conflict in Nigeria*

Andy Rowell, James Marriott
and
Lorne Stockman

CONSTABLE • LONDON

Constable & Robinson Ltd
3 The Lanchesters
162 Fulham Palace Road
London W6 9ER
www.constablerobinson.com

First published in the UK by Constable,
an imprint of Constable & Robinson Ltd, 2005

Copyright © Andy Rowell, James Marriott and Lorne Stockman 2005

The right of Andy Rowell, James Marriott and
Lorne Stockman to be identified as the authors
of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

All rights reserved. This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.

A copy of the British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
is available from the British Library.

ISBN 1-84529-259-6

Printed and bound in the EU

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----|
| <i>Acknowledgements</i> | vii |
| <i>Preface</i> | ix |
| 1 A Span of Ten Years | 1 |
| 2 The Colonial Company | 41 |
| 3 Crisis After Crisis | 65 |
| 4 An Intertwined Alliance | 96 |
| 5 A Shock to the System | 115 |
| 6 Corruption Begins at Home | 140 |
| 7 The Next Gulf | 172 |
| 8 Six Months in the Making of History | 211 |
| 9 Voices from the Delta – A Programme for change | 247 |
| <i>Appendix 1: Maps</i> | 251 |
| <i>Appendix 2: Glossary</i> | 261 |
| <i>Reference Notes</i> | 265 |
| <i>Index</i> | 295 |

CHAPTER THREE

Crisis After Crisis

Ogoni protest song, 1970:
*'The Flames of Shell are flames of hell
We bask below their light
Nought for us serve the blight
Of cursed neglect and cursed Shell'*¹

We've Got Oil

The children thought it was a giant bird flying in the sky, making a terrible noise. They had never seen anything like it before. The helicopter landed on the long green grass of the lawn of Oloibiri's St Michael's church, built by missionaries sixty years earlier. It bore a logo they did not understand: that of the Shell-BP Development Company. As the village children watched open-mouthed, two more helicopters appeared over the palm-oil trees and landed on the clean, blue-green river, named after the town of Oloibiri in Ijawland. The oilmen had arrived.

The local teacher at the time, Princess Joy Amangala, recalled that 'several days later, some of the white men came back screaming "We've got oil! We've got oil!"' No wonder they were happy. Having spent some £15 million and more than 14 years looking for oil, Shell-BP had finally struck lucky: they had found oil in commercially viable quantities. Nigeria's oil industry was born. The year was 1956.

Over the next few months a parallel town was built close to Oloibiri. It was called 'Shell Oloibiri', and in came a new road, electricity, water, prefabricated houses, and everything the oil workers wanted. Well, not quite everything. 'One Shell worker, Mr Taytee, asked for some girls to be brought to his cabin,' recalls Joy Amangala, 'but my friends and I laughed at the idea. Mr Taytee's tummy was a bucket-size.'²

Two years later the first shipment of oil was ready. In February 1958 Eric Drake, Chairman of Supply and Development for BP, flew from Heathrow airport to Lagos, then travelled on by road to Port Harcourt for the ceremonial announcement of the first shipment of Nigerian crude – 'Bonny Light'. Standing alongside Drake here senior representatives from Shell and the Shell-BP Development Company of Nigeria. The crude tanker slipped down the Bonny River and began its journey to Shellhaven in Essex, Shell's refinery at the mouth of the river Thames.

The crude that was loaded onto that first ship had come from a number of wells in the oil fields at Oloibiri and Afam in Ogoniland. She was the first of a steady stream of ships that sailed to Shellhaven and at BP's complex on the southern shore of the Thames estuary, the Kent Refinery.

At Shellhaven over the following weeks the Nigerian crude was refined into petrol, aviation fuel and other products. The petrol was reloaded onto a Shell river tanker which transported the fuel 30 miles up the Thames to the Shell-Mex & BP terminal at Wandsworth, in south-west London. From this depot, road tankers distributed the petrol to service stations in south London, Middlesex, Surrey and Sussex – fuel for the cars that symbolized the booming British post-war economy. That same year, 1958, saw the opening of the first motorway in the UK, the M6 near Preston.

Meanwhile, the aviation fuel refined from Bonny Light at

Shellhaven was transported to Heathrow, energy for planes such as that which had taken Drake to Lagos. That same year of 1958 saw the first transatlantic passenger service from London to New York. Oil from the Niger Delta was fueling the engines of the South of England. The geology of Nigeria burnt in the streets of London and in the skies above it.

Two years later, at Nigerian Independence, Shell-BP's spider's web of operations had begun to spread out from Oloibiri and Afam into other areas of the Delta (see Map 4). The company had twenty-four oil fields with commercial potential, of which around eleven were already producing. Although the first oil had been found at Oloibiri in Ijawland, it was Ogoniland, with five of the first eleven fields, that bore the brunt of Shell-BP's oil development.

These first finds were all oil fields, although when oil comes out of the ground, it is very rarely extracted just as oil: normally it has some natural gas with it, called in the industry 'associated gas'. Under the high pressures under ground, this gas is actually dissolved in the oil, but separates from it as the pressure on the liquid is reduced on its way to the surface. At the surface the gas can be captured, piped away, and used as fuel for domestic or industrial purposes.

But for nearly fifty years Nigeria's 'associated gas', burnt off in vast flames tens of feet in length that roar across the landscape, flaring day and night. Within four years of the first oil find at Oloibiri, there were a hundred gas flares in the Delta. These huge flames are today still visible from the satellites in space. From 1958 to 2003, according to Opec, Nigeria produced a total of 22.8 billion barrells of oil. According to Shell 1,000 cubic feet of gas is flared per barrel of oil. The total gas – flared – roughly 22.8 trillion cubic feet – is slightly more than the UK's total natural gas reserves in the North Sea in 2004. 'Some children have never

known a dark night even though they have no electricity,' wrote British environmentalist Nick Ashton-Jones after one visit.³ The flares created a new sound that had never existed before, and a new smell that burnt villagers' nostrils and throats. And the acid rain that it created rotted the corrugated roofs of their homes.

For the villagers living next to such constant degrading noise, air and heat pollution cause a lethal cocktail of health problems such as child respiratory illnesses, asthma and cancer, all leading to premature deaths. A groundbreaking report by Environmental Rights Action (ERA) and the Climate Justice Programme (CJP) has tried to quantify the damage gas flaring does. They have estimated that in Bayelsa State alone it is statistically likely to cause 49 premature deaths, 5,000 respiratory illnesses among children and some 120,000 asthma attacks and 8 additional causes of cancer each year.⁴

In all, this 'toxic cocktail' violates 'the communities' rights guaranteed under Nigerian law, such as to live in dignity, and 'to enjoy health and a satisfactory environment', conclude ERA and the CJP.⁵ If systematic and chronic pollution of the local population were not a serious enough crime, there is also pollution of the planet, and climate change.

The flaring that started at Oloibiri has continued every day since. ERA and CJP describe it as 'a story of appalling carelessness, greed, corruption, double standards and environmental racism. Perhaps, above all, it is a story of serial, cumulative and shameful failure, on the part of British colonialism, the oil companies and the Nigerian ruling elite.'⁶ Shell has not responded formally to the report but its Non-Executive Chairman, Lord Oxburgh, has provided one possible explanation for its policy on flaring. In a 2005 interview he insisted that 'the locals appreciate the flares as a heat source to dry their fish.'⁷

In the 1970s each field in the Delta was operated by a team of Shell engineers manning the drilling rigs, all brought in from Europe, assisted by some locally employed labour. The split between local and European labour has always been a source of contention. 'It is interesting that Shell should be encountering this difficulty about employing expatriates,' one Foreign and Commonwealth Office document noted in 1970. 'It seems to me ridiculous to suggest that "there are plenty of Nigerians who could work computers".'⁸

With the Europeans came all the trappings of a Western lifestyle, alien and luxurious to the locals, like constant electricity and water, televisions and fridges. So too came the prostitutes, alcohol and all the other less salubrious by-products of the oil industry.

And in came the bulldozers. For each oil field, forest was felled or farmland cleared to create the new industrial landscape. The shiny steel structures of the drilling rigs rose high above the flat land, mangrove and palm-oil forests. They created a new horizon that had never existed before.

From each well-head where the gas was flared, pipelines carried the crude oil in 'flowlines' to a central gathering point, or 'flow station'. Each flowline meant a strip was cut through the forest, mangrove, or farmland that had to be kept clear of vegetation – lines of industrialization cutting across villages or fragile ecosystems. In contrast, companies undertaking on-shore oil production in England buried these flowlines in order to minimize their environmental and human impact. But in colonial and immediately post-Independence Nigeria, communities bore the burden – in terms of the impact on their villages, farmland, creeks and forests – of Shell-BP taking the cheaper option of laying pipes above ground as opposed to burying them.

The oil's journey continued from flowline to flowstations –

large installations, once again built on land cleared of forest and farming, where the oil from each oilfield was gathered together and pumped into a main oil pipeline. These main lines ran to the terminal at Port Harcourt, where Shell engineers had designed and built a terminal on the banks of the Bonny River. Here tankers would load up to transport the oil to Europe.

Slowly but surely a grid of industrial oil development began to spread across the Delta. Communities faced the loss of their farmland. The web of pipelines was an echo of the web of roads and railways constructed at the opening of the colonial period fifty years before. They woke to the belching and burning of flares. Resentment about flaring burnt deep in the communities of the Delta, and while it might have been the cheaper option for the companies not to bury their pipelines, this issue would come back to haunt them.

As the first petrol from Nigerian crude was transported up the Thames from Shellhaven to the Wandsworth Shell depot, the river-tanker passed another construction site, that of the new Shell Centre at Waterloo. Constructed in Portland stone, with 26 storeys and its own cinema, shooting range and swimming pool, the building was opened on 12 June 1963 and towered over the Houses of Parliament on the opposite bank of the Thames.

Shell had moved its headquarters from St Helen's Court in the City, the place of the market, to Westminster, the place of the state. It was a bold statement of Shell's position in the political life of Britain and her colonies, a statement of confidence built on the back of the prospects for and the profits from oil extraction in provinces such as Nigeria. The Shell Centre was a set of towers, and chairman's the office on the 26th floor commanded one of the best views in London. It was a fitting representation of the hierarchical nature of the company. Each floor contained a dif-

ferent department – accountants on one floor, the marketing department on another. It was a building that emphasized the hermetic nature of the company – with all but a handful of its global activities being carried out by Shell staff.

For forty years Nigeria has helped fuel Shell's global empire, run predominantly from the Shell Centre in London. During the decades, as military dictators came and went, Shell stayed put in Nigeria. The oil industry is all about risk – political and financial – and the rich financial rewards for the company far outweighed the risks. Nigeria might have been politically unstable, but it was still more stable than the Middle East.⁹ In this country of change, Shell stayed solid as a rock. The more unstable the regime of the day the more important it was for it to give incentives for the oil companies to stay, because they were now providing the financial life-blood that enabled the regime to stay in power. Shell and the Nigerian government became intertwined.

Nigeria has also been a root cause of a corporate crisis that has resulted in the the merger in 2005 of Shell's two parent companies, Royal Dutch Shell and the Shell Transport and Trading Company. But this is not the first crisis Shell and its close collaborator, the British government, have had to face in Nigeria, or because of its Nigerian operations.

Just Not Cricket

Oloibiri, the Nigerian town where oil was first produced, is also the birthplace of the Ijaw leader Isaac Boro, seen as one of the first people to stand up and fight for the rights of the minorities of the Niger Delta. In February 1966 Boro, equipped with £150 and a red flag, formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Service. 'If we do not move,' he said, 'we would throw ourselves into perpetual

slavery.’ His mission was to take up with the oil companies ‘their continued atrocities to our people and their wicked reluctance to improve the lot of the people they were bound to be associated with for long’. He wanted to ‘make out estimated bills for payment by the oil companies with respect to inadequate damages paid to natives for cash crops and economic trees destroyed during their operations.’ He declared an independent state in the Niger Delta, and announced that all oil contracts were null and void. But the revolution was short-lived.

In a reflection of how the colonial authorities had dealt with ‘subversion’ that was also a precursor to later events, the Army was called in. Boro and his men watched the soldiers move into position using pontoon boats provided by Shell. The following month, Boro handed himself in. The first Ijaw revolution was over, though not forgotten. Boro was charged with treason, but his death sentence was commuted. He was killed during the Biafran War, fighting as a Federal soldier.¹⁰

The Biafran War that started in 1967 nearly ripped Nigeria apart. It also threatened the Shell-BP oil operations which had been growing in the region for the past decade. Political, ethnic and economic factors all played a part in the build-up to the war, but at its heart the conflict was about oil. It was ‘not so much a war to maintain the unity and integrity of the country,’ argue Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, ‘as a desperate gambit by the Federal government to win back the oil fields of the Niger Delta from Biafra.’¹¹

In January 1966 a military coup against the democratic government had resulted in the death of the then Federal Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa. It was followed by a counter-coup in July 1966 that landed a Christian northerner, General Jack Gowon, in power. The governor of the Eastern region, where the vast majority of Nigerian oil reserves are found, proclaimed

independence, wanting to keep the precious oil revenues in the new state of Biafra. On 6 July 1967 the Federal government, led by General Gowon, declared war to prevent this secession.

An indication of how concerned the British were about the war is given in a document sent from Harold Wilson, the then Prime Minister, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Dated some three weeks into the war, it states: 'It is of national importance that the Shell-BP investment in Nigeria, which is a major British interest, of crucial importance for our balance of payments position and for our economic recovery, should be protected. I therefore wish that everything should be done, as a matter of the greatest possible urgency, but for the present within the context of our existing policy on Nigeria, to help Shell-BP and the Federal Nigerian authorities to establish effective protection of our oil investments.'¹²

Although the British government saw Shell-BP's oil as 'our' oil, they had a problem: they could not be seen to become directly involved in the war. The Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart replied to the Prime Minister that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) were in 'continuous touch with Shell' and David Barran over what to do. Barran, as Chairman of the Committee for Managing Directors, working out of the Shell Centre in London, was ultimately responsible for Shell-BP's operations in the country. In his book about the global oil industry, *Seven Sisters*, Anthony Sampson says Barran 'was a figure of stature in the oil world; he was precisely articulate, wore a monocle and had the style of a cultivated country squire.'¹³

After Shell-BP's installations came under attack by the Biafrans, the FCO arranged for 'some light guns for anti-aircraft defence to be made available to the Nigerians . . . whilst obviously we cannot attach strings to the supply, we will do our best to see that they play

their proper part in the defence of the Shell-BP installations.’ The government also gave Shell the ‘names of five suitably qualified retired officers . . . to advise them on passive air defence measures (e.g. camouflage, decoy installations).’ This man would be employed by Shell-BP on a temporary contract.

Stewart also offered General Gowon ‘a visit by two Royal Air Force officers to see whether there is anything they can do to advise the Federal authorities on how they could better prosecute the air war’. However, ‘the officers would be ostensibly on a visit to, and attached to, the High Commission and would be in plain clothes. We would hope that their presence would escape the attention of the press . . . we should certainly wish to avoid any impression that Her Majesty’s Government were directly involved in the conduct of air operations in Nigeria.’¹⁴

The British government was walking a tightrope. On the one hand, they were helping the Federal government and Shell-BP in private; on the other, they wanted to be seen to be doing little in public. In October 1967 Michael Stewart met representatives of Shell and BP. A speaking note prepared for him said: ‘We cannot allow Nigeria to become our Vietnam. It is a matter for the Nigerians but if, because of the urgency of the need, they wished to recruit white mercenary gunners and took the initiative in looking for them, we might be able to give them some covert help in recruitment. You might like to suggest to them they should do this. To save face the gunners could be described as technicians . . . the continuance of your operations is a matter of national importance to us.’¹⁵

South of the Nigerian coast in the middle of the Gulf of Guinea are the islands of São Tomé, which in 1967 were still a Portuguese colony. Shell’s operations on the islands were also causing the British government some concern. A letter from the

High Commission in May 1969 outlined them: 'You will, I imagine, already be aware from your close relations with Shell in the context of the Nigerian war, that Shell are also fuelling the planes carrying the airlift into Biafra from São Tomé. This presents them with a minor conflict of interest.'¹⁶

The letter continued: 'Shell are the only company who have been supplying aviation fuel at São Tomé. When the war began they supplied the few planes staging there with fuel. This represented a small amount. As the war continued the amounts became larger, and in a modest way represented what appeared to be a money-spinner for Shell. One of their customers was the American gun-runner, Wharton, who a year or so ago was flying arms into Biafra via Portugal and São Tomé. Shell was apparently unwise enough to give him credit, and he has left them with the bad debt of 5 million escudos (say £75,000). According to the local and newly arrived Shell manager here, his head office told him in London that the less they knew about the Shell operations in São Tomé the better. They are evidently willing to do business there as long as this does not attract unfavourable publicity.'

The British wondered 'whether any interruption or reduction of the airlift from São Tomé into Biafra could help to bring about the end of the war? If so, then Shell could perhaps be prevailed upon to cut off their supplies of aviation fuel to São Tomé for a short period.'

One of the hand-written suggestions from the FCO in response was: 'If you felt that this might be put to Shell, it could perhaps be in the basis that gun-running to armed rebels against a regime with which we (and the Dutch) have close and cordial relations is naturally an activity on which HMG frowns and would hope that any partly British company would avoid entanglement in such activity.'¹⁷

The war ended when the commander of the 3rd Marine Commando Division, Olusegun Obasanjo, now President of Nigeria, accepted the surrender of Biafran forces in January 1970. The oil industry, having scaled back operations during the war, was keen for a full-scale expansion. It soon happened. By the early 1970s BP and Shell's combined investment in the country was some £100 million a year.¹⁸

There were setbacks, however. The British felt that their support for the Federal side in the war should have paid commercial dividends for Shell-BP. This was not to be. Hand-written notes on documents from the Public Record Office in London reveal that 'Shell-BP do not seem to expect to get further concessions in Nigeria' but just 'hoped the Nigerians will not try to change the terms of the existing concessions'.¹⁹

The British and Shell were also annoyed that their support for the Federal government had not stood them in greater stead than the Italians and French, who had supported the Biafrans. After Shell 'expressed surprise' to the FCO that nothing more had been made of the French and Italian involvement with the Biafrans, one FCO official wrote: 'We have allowed the French to get clean away with what they did in Nigeria and it is we, and not the French, who are now having a rough time with the Nigerians. I think myself this is deplorable, but results from our playing cricket while other people are playing karate.'²⁰

A Forty-Year Fight

In 1965, two years after Shell moved into the Shell Centre and two years before the Biafran war started, an Ogoni school teacher from Taabaa, Sam Badilo Bako, sent a letter to Shell-

BP. 'Today, we need education, we need employment, we want to eat, we want to live,' said Bako. 'We do not want our children to remain out of school . . . we do not want to lack money because Shell has removed land, which used to be our main source of revenue. In short, we do not want to live in a vicious circle in which we shall see Shell-BP as the authors of our misfortune and our oppressors . . . Is it not an irony that those who live on top of wealth should be the poorest people in the nation?'²¹

At the height of the Biafran war, in April 1968, Ken Saro-Wiwa, then a member of the Rivers State Executive, penned a pamphlet that came straight from the heart. Titled *The Ogoni Nationality Today and Tomorrow*, it embodied his first published ideas on the Ogoni struggle. 'The Rivers State has been created, and a new Nigeria born. But we must remember that no matter the system of government, unless a people take a destiny into their own hands, no improvement will come to them.'²² It was his first rallying call to his people.

Saro-Wiwa later wrote about how his 'pious' hopes failed to stir the Ogoni leadership at the time. But by 1970 certain Ogoni chiefs had had enough of living with Shell-BP as their neighbour and occupier. In his book *Genocide in Nigeria*, Saro-Wiwa recalls what happened: 'Matters came to a head in April 1970 when Ogoni leaders, unable to bear the chicanery and heartlessness of the Company, were forced to petition the Military Governor of Rivers State in a carefully considered memorandum.'

In a 'Humble Petition', Ogoni chiefs wrote that they were 'alerting the State Government to the fact that the Shell-BP operations in this Division are seriously threatening the well-being, and even the very lives, of the people of Ogoni Division.' They argued that Shell-BP 'destroys cash crops and economic

trees without giving adequate compensation to their owners'. As the current Commissioner for Education in Rivers State, Saro-Wiwa also received a copy.²³

Just under two months later, a Mr J. Spinks, the Manager for Eastern Division for Shell-BP, (see Chart 1) noted that this petition was 'one of series which have originated' from Ogoni over the 'past few years'. 'Statements are made,' he argued in his reply to it, 'which, on examination, bear little relation to what is actually taking place. Regrettably this petition is no exception to the rule.' Spinks went on to argue that Shell-BP had 'been extremely careful to ensure that our operations cause minimal disturbance to the people in the areas in which we operate . . . There can be no doubt,' he concluded, that 'the incidental benefits accruing to Ogoni Division from Shell-BP's presence there greatly outweigh any disadvantages.'²⁴

Saro-Wiwa met Spinks on a couple of occasions and characterized him as 'a genial and accommodating man', but described his letter as 'Shellspeak' that could easily be dismissed. Saro-Wiwa also argued that Shell-BP's assertion that it had a good record was publicly undermined when just over a month later there was a major installation blow-out at Bomu, in Ogoniland, that lasted three weeks. The blow-out caused outrage. 'Our rivers, rivulets, and creeks are all covered with crude oil,' the Dere Youths Association wrote. 'We no longer breathe the natural oxygen, rather we inhale lethal and ghastly gases. Our water can no longer be drunk unless one wants to test the effect of crude oil on the body. We no longer use vegetables, they are all polluted.'²⁵ Saro-Wiwa wrote in 1992 that the area remained a wasteland for decades.²⁶

Spinks's contention that the Ogoni complaints were at odds with the situation on the ground is contradicted by internal FCO

correspondence. It was Mr Spinks whom an FCO official met that November as well as the then Colonel Obasanjo, among others. While the FCO official was quite overcome by Spinks's 'enthusiasm' for oil, he noted that Spinks 'clearly has little interest in anything outside oil. He had no views on the political scene, local, national or international. When we asked about conditions in Port Harcourt, no more than 2–3 miles from the Shell-BP work area, he said he had little idea since he had only been there about four times in six months. Others confirmed that the oil company personnel keep very much to themselves. This appears to cause some resentment amongst other members of the British community.'²⁷ But it is the resentment of the communities of the Delta that has come back to haunt Shell time and time again.

'White' versus 'black'

In the early 1970s other issues to do with Nigeria were beginning to occupy Shell-BP and the British government, fundamentally intertwined as they were. At the birth of the joint venture in 1936, Shell's partner BP was 51 per cent owned by the British state. From 1914, when Winston Churchill purchased shares in AIOC on behalf of the state, until the sale of these shares from 1976, the British government held the controlling stake in BP. The government operated an arm's-length policy in relation to the company's management, through the simple mechanism of appointing two members of BP's board. The Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company was, consequently, in part a British state-owned company.

Shell-BP and the government worried that Nigeria might follow Libya and nationalize its oil industry. General Gowon had

also expressed ‘admiration for Algeria’, a fact that was ‘not welcomed’ by the British government, worried about the closeness of Iraq, Algeria and Libya.²⁸ If Shell-BP operations in the country were nationalized, it would be the British government and not just Shell-BP that would suffer.

But what was really worrying the British government and Shell-BP was the threat of some kind of retributive action by the Nigerians in the face of British government support for the white governments of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. In July 1970 an FCO note outlined how Ashley Raeburn, a Director on the Board of Shell (see Chart 1) had called ‘this morning to put on record the interest of Shell in the possible repercussions of policies which might be adopted towards South Africa and Rhodesia’.²⁹

Ashley Raeburn was an Oxford graduate with a love of walking, gardening and music. He had come to Shell from the Civil Service, where he had worked at the then Ministry of Food and HM Treasury. Having been Group Treasurer, he was now Director of Shell International Petroleum Company with responsibility for Africa, India and Pakistan. He was later appointed CBE (Commander of the Order of the British Empire).³⁰

Mr Raeburn left that meeting at the FCO with a ‘strictly confidential’ note outlining the ‘Implications for the commercial interests of the Royal Dutch/Shell group’ resulting from the ‘British Policy in Africa’. Although Shell’s investment in South Africa was considered ‘significant, profitable and one which the Group is anxious to preserve and develop’, it was not so ‘critical to future Group profitability as the investment in exploration and oil production activity in Nigeria’. Investment in Nigeria was also likely ‘to grow more rapidly than [that] in South Africa

over the next decade'. Because of Shell-BP's investment in Nigeria, the leverage 'Black Africa' had on the company was 'very considerable'.³²

The recently independent 'Black African' states were stalwart in their opposition to the white apartheid regime in South Africa, and Nigeria, as the most populous of these states, had assumed leadership of 'Black Africa'. Hence Shell's concern. Later that month the Chairman of Shell, David Barran, met Sir Alec Douglas-Home, former Conservative Prime Minister and now Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in Edward Heath's government. Barran 'raised the question of arms for South Africa as it affected Nigeria. Shell was apprehensive of the reaction of the African states' and feared that General Gowon might place restrictions on Shell-BP's oil production in Nigeria. 'This would be a serious matter for the UK', creating a 'dangerous situation'. Barran pointed out that Nigerian oil was 'good quality' and 'the one major counter-weight to Arab oil'. Douglas-Home responded that 'the whole issue had been immensely exaggerated'.³²

So the British government was not yet publicly worried about possible Nigerian action with regard to South Africa; but their concerns were heightened when in May 1971 the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation was established. Two months later Nigeria joined OPEC. The first step in the 'indigenization' of Nigeria's oil had begun. Oil now accounted for 75 per cent of Nigeria's export revenues – up from 1 per cent in 1958.³³ This meant that Nigeria was increasingly dependent on the international oil market.

The South African problem continued to vex Shell-BP. In April 1972 David Barran, now Sir David, met Sir Alec Douglas-Home again at the FCO. Shell-BP was by now investing a million pounds a week in Nigeria.³⁴ Barran said Shell were worried by the

‘unpleasant threats and innuendoes and suggestions that Nigeria might follow the Libyan president’ and once again ‘stressed the importance of Nigerian oil to the United Kingdom’ and the fact that it provided a ‘counter balance to Arab oil’. Sir Alec replied that ‘he had these considerations very much in mind’.³⁵

By the following month the FCO and the Department of Trade and Industry had investigated potential scenarios of Nigerian action against BP and Shell. The conclusion was that the probable higher limit of Nigerian action designed to ‘spite HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] would be expropriation of the BP share (50 per cent) of the joint Shell-BP company’. However, ‘expropriation of the Shell share alone is unlikely as a means of getting at HMG because only 40 per cent of the shareholding is British and HMG has no direct stake.’³⁶

This latter observation led Lord Rothschild, ex-MI5 agent and head of Prime Minister Edward Heath’s Central Policy Review Staff, to write to Robert Armstrong, Heath’s principal Private Secretary: ‘BP’s vulnerability in such circumstances would clearly be less if HMG’s shareholding were reduced (or eliminated) and if the all-British character of the company were diluted.’³⁷

A document in the UK National Archive bears Armstrong’s neat handwriting, informing the Prime Minister of Rothschild’s suggestion: ‘I am not clear that we do want to respond to this. Admittedly we might be less exposed to Nigerian threats of expropriation. Against that, however, German or Japanese participation would not be any help in arguments with OPEC about participation for the exporting countries – indeed it might whet their appetites. And we should be in a less strong position to maximise the benefits for this country (as opposed to Europe) for the exploitation of North Sea Oil.’

Above this note, in the right-hand corner, is Ted Heath’s

scribble: 'I do not wish to reopen this, largely because of X below', which corresponds to the section on the North Sea. 'The reason the Nigerians would not go for Shell surely is because of the 60% Dutch holding, not because there is no British Gov. interest.'³⁸

The issue continued to worry both Shell and the British government, but the National Archive has yet to release more up-to-date documents. Nigeria's military government finally nationalized BP's share in 1979. The person who ordered it was none other than General Olusegun Obasanjo, the country's military ruler at the time.³⁹ With BP's share nationalized, Shell would have to endure any further crises on its own. It had not long to wait.

The militarization of Commerce

The company was about to enter a new, much more controversial stage of its Nigerian history, one that continues to this day. Iko is a small fishing village on one of the many sand-barrier islands that extend along the Nigerian coast. On the one side is the Atlantic, on the other mangrove swamps and brackish creeks. Shell-BP had struck oil in 1973 in the town in Andoniland, which is next to Ogoni. According to Environmental Rights Action the company was gas-flaring twenty-four hours a day.

In 1980, the year after BP's nationalization, the community sent a letter to SPDC and the Federal government demanding 'compensation and restitution of our rights to clean air, water, and a viable environment'. They received no reply. Two years later they peacefully demonstrated against Shell, asking them to be a 'good neighbour to us'. The police were called, and demonstrators were arrested and mistreated.

In 1987, the community once again held a peaceful demon-

stration. In response SPDC called in the Mobile Police Force, who were transported in three company speedboats. Two people were killed and nearly forty houses destroyed, making 350 people homeless. The troop's use of Shell-BP's transport was reminiscent of Boro's experience 21 years earlier.⁴⁰

This murder of two civilians by the state forces of the military government of General Babaginda, marks a watershed in the history of the Delta. The increasing mobilisation of the military by the oil companies in response to community protests is resented by many in the Delta.

The communities point out the oil companies would not act like that in Britain or America. From now on any community protesting ran the risk of military repercussions. Repercussions could mean death. The pattern had been set. Since then oil operations have become intertwined with the Nigerian military and Mobile Police Force (MPF). Violence has become the norm.

The use of the military and Mobile Police by the oil companies has created huge resentment in the communities. Initially Shell defended its position by arguing that requests for mobile 'police assistance was in strict accordance with Federal government requirements when interruption to oil production may be caused.'

However the company later modified its position to 'SPDC is not required to inform the military or any governing body of any demonstration. It has never claimed that this is the case. What SPDC has said is that it regards itself as being under a duty to alert the authorities if it thinks that actions [sic] is going to occur which will result in damage to oil installations and disruption to oil production'.⁴¹

This change in their approach reflects the dilemma oil companies find themselves in, working in a country like Nigeria

where the use of force is much more routine than in the companies' host countries. So the likelihood is that if the oil companies do call for 'military assistance' there will be violence, regardless of the oil companies' wishes. The communities, for their part, blame the oil companies for this violence as much as they do the police or military. They see the violence as being the responsibility of the oil companies. The use of the military by the companies is now becoming routine to protect their installations. Indeed the WAC report (see Chapter One) even noted that when Shell staff 'and particularly senior staff, visits the community they are typically escorted by the Mobile Police.'

This sends various messages to the communities, including the sense of 'victimisation when the company tries to bully us' and reinforces the notion that Shell was 'stealing oil' because 'why would they otherwise come armed [with police and army]?'⁴²

In 1990 the Etche people demonstrated against Shell at the village of Umuechem 'because they had seen Shell continually exploit their land without adequate compensation', according to one villager. Despite what had happened before, Shell specifically requested the MPF. A letter written by Joshua Udofia, Manager for the Eastern Division for SPDC, said: 'In anticipation of the above threat, we request that you urgently provide us with security protection (preferably Mobile Police Force) at this location.'⁴³

The MPF subsequently massacred 80 people and destroyed 495 houses, as well as countless vehicles and motor-cycles. The MPF then killed and ate all the livestock of the village, including the goats and chickens. The subsequent Commission of Inquiry heard from the villagers that the demonstrations had been peaceful. The reason for their protest was that Shell's 'drilling operations have had serious adverse effects on the Umuechem

people who are predominately farmers, in that their lands had been acquired and their crops damaged with little or no compensation, and [they] are thus left without farmlands or means of livelihood. Their farmlands are covered by oil spillage / blow-out and rendered unsuitable for farming.⁴⁴

The Inquiry blamed the police for the massacre, and did not attribute any blame to Shell. The company tried to distance itself from the killings, saying the problems of the community 'were not really of Shell's making at all'.⁴⁵ The company also maintained it was 'inconceivable that SPDC would have suggested the deployment of the Mobile Police if it had had an inkling of what might happen'. It added that the Iko incidents three years previously in which the MPF had killed several protesters 'did not stand out in the minds of SPDC people'.⁴⁶ Despite these events Shell was to request military assistance and protesters would again be shot.

Shell argues that it has not operated in Ogoni since January 1993. However, in late April 1993 the Shell contractor Willbros started bulldozing people's farmland in the Ogoni village of Biara for the construction of the Rumuekpe-Bomu pipeline. Shell and Willbros claim that the company had followed all legal land acquisition procedures. The construction work provoked mass demonstrations that according to Human Rights Watch were totally peaceful. When Karalolo Korgbara attempted to collect what was left of her crops, she was shot in the arm by soldiers, and the arm later had to be amputated.⁴⁷

On 3 May thousands of protesters gathered to complain about this shooting. Another demonstrator, Agbarator Otu, was shot in the back and killed, and a further twenty people were injured.⁴⁸ That same day James Ken Tillery, the Willbros Divisional Manager, wrote to Joshua Udofia, Managing Director

of Shell's Eastern Division, who had called in the MPF in Umuechem. Tillery complained about the security situation and urgently requested that SPDC take 'necessary action for a timely resolution to the problems in order to mitigate further cost and schedule implications'.⁴⁹

On receipt of this letter, the following day, 4 May, Udofia sent a letter to Chief Rufus Ada George, the Governor of Rivers State, enclosing a copy of the Willbros letter. Rufus Ada George was an ex-Shell employee, and relations between MOSOP and George were poor.⁵⁰ 'As at now, work has been suspended in this area of the line which carries a significant portion of the crude oil production from Shell and Elf operations,' wrote Udofia. 'We humbly request the usual assistance of His Excellency to enable the project to proceed.'⁵¹ 'Usual assistance' meant the military. Shell later admitted that Willbros had paid the 'field allowances and transportation' of the military, although it maintained that 'the Willbros army escort was not involved in any incident that caused injury to or the death of third parties'.⁵²

Five months later Udofia was again embroiled in controversy in Ogoni. In October 1993 Shell, eager to re-enter Ogoni, visited the village of Korokoro accompanied by 'security personnel provided by the government'. The community protested against the visit. But later that month 24 armed personnel returned to 'dialogue' with the community. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Okuntimo, soldiers from the 2nd Amphibious Brigade accompanied Shell staff into Ogoni. These soldiers were being paid field allowances by Shell. Three people were shot, resulting in the death of one person, Uebari Nna. Shell doubted whether 'any member of the community was shot or wounded': Dr Owens Wiwa, a medical doctor, carried out the autopsy.⁵³ Saro-Wiwa called it 'unprovoked murder' and 'further confir-

mation of the collaboration of Shell and the Nigerian security forces in the genocide of the Ogoni people'.⁵⁴

The Korokoro community was so outraged that two company fire-trucks were 'stolen'. In a letter dated 25 October, Egbert Imomoh, the new Manager for Shell's Eastern Division, wrote to Ada George to seek 'possible assistance in recovering the fire vehicle'.⁵⁵ The following day Imomoh and Udofia wrote again to Ada George, reiterating the 'need for adequate security for our operations in the Ogoni area'.⁵⁶ To the commission set up to examine these issues, known as the Oputa Panel (see Chapter 1), Imomoh later swore under oath that Shell had not been involved in any human rights abuses in the Delta.

Despite his involvement in these incidents today, fifteen years later, Joshua Udofia is employed by Shell as a 'senior corporate advisor' based in London. He was Shell's representative at the launch of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Niger Delta in June 2005 in London. Some in Ogoni regard as insensitive Udofia's presence at a meeting that is investigating the causes and solutions to the conflict of the Delta.

According to Shell these two incidents in 1993 were the only ones before 1996 in which the company paid the field allowances of the military. But they were also paying the police. Just two months later, in December 1993, Phil Watts, the Managing Director of Shell Companies in Nigeria, wrote to the Inspector General of Police in Lagos to 'reiterate our appreciation for the excellent co-operation we have received from the Nigerian Police Force in helping to preserve the security of our operations'.

Watts also confirmed that 300 police in Port Harcourt and 250 in Warri had been assigned to Shell. To facilitate this, Watts gave Shell's 'commitment to provide complete logistics, accommodation and welfare support' to the police assigned them, and to

‘fully support the cost of setting up and maintaining the contingents’. Watts also confirmed the number of Shell’s ‘Spy police’ at 600.

In the letter, Watts asked for permission to upgrade its firearms, which included semi-automatic weapons and pump-action shotguns. Possibly to persuade the police to agree to his request, Watts emphasizes ‘that SPDC produces more than 50 per cent of Nigeria’s oil, which has a consequential major impact on the country’s economy.’⁵⁷ It was these revelations that caused Claude Ake, Saro-Wiwa’s old friend, to say that Shell had privatized Nigeria and that ‘it is time to call Shell to order and account’.⁵⁸

As the Ogoni campaign intensified through 1993 and 1994, the backlash wrought on them by the military was beyond the comprehension of most people. Their campaign led to some 2,000 Ogoni being killed, some 30,000 made homeless, countless others tortured and raped.⁵⁹ It led to the judicial murder of Saro-Wiwa and the eight others. Saro-Wiwa claimed that he and the others had been condemned to death as a result of their campaign against Shell.

Although there is no longer a military Federal government in Nigeria, there are still claims that Shell operates behind the shield of the military and that the militarization of commerce continues to this day. Ledum Mitee, the President of MOSOP, says that Shell is still paying people in the police armouries. ‘I have it on good authority that for last year Shell has given contributions to the security forces of some \$2 million.’ Mitee argues that Shell are also ‘engaging’ retired military personnel who used to be in the Abacha regime, ‘some of whom have been cited for human rights abuses’.

‘They use these people to bring in the military to provide a

security shield,' he continues. 'I think we have gone beyond the point where they deny they operate behind a security shield. Some of the people who work in armoury departments of the security forces have top-up fees from Shell, which is supposed to be an inducement for them when there is some Shell-related operation. Guns are released without any bottle-necks.'⁶⁰

In response Shell says that 'Due to the security situation in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian government from time to time deploys teams of combined forces to patrol areas around our facilities. These forces are paid by the government and, when requested by the government, we provide logistics support.' However, the company maintains that 'It is illegal to hire private security in Nigeria. Many companies use supernumerary police officers, who are assigned to protect companies' facilities from crime. We do not pay "top up fees". We do pay field allowances as requested by the government as part of our logistics support.'⁶⁰

But many people, including Ken Wiwa, believe it is time to hold Shell to account for its close association with the military. 'You can't just commit a crime against a people,' he says. 'You have to be held accountable. It is a basic principle of law. If you commit a crime you have to be held accountable for that crime.'⁶²

Chart 1. Structure of Shell, BP and Shell-BP Nigeria, 1970

Companies are 100% owned by parent company unless otherwise stated





Chart 2. Structure of Shell and Shell Nigeria, 2005

Companies are 100% owned by parent company unless otherwise stated



* NNPC: National Nigerian Petroleum Company

All My Life – Andy Rowell

So the first recorded letter from Ogoni was sent in 1965, the year of my birth. That was forty years ago. The following year, Isaac Boro formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force. For the last 40 years the Ogoni and Ijaw have fought for their rights to control their own resources and for a clean environment. For them, Shell has represented a forty-year fight for their right to control their resources and to a clean environment. Nothing has changed. For forty years. Just stop for a moment and think what has happened to the world in forty years: a generation of huge political, social, cultural and technological change. But in the Delta, it is as if time has stood still.

Yesterday a wire report from the Delta described how ‘Hundreds of ethnic Ogoni youths attacked and burned a police station near the Nigerian oil city of Port Harcourt on Tuesday after officers shot dead one protester.’ Riot police had been sent to the area.⁶³ Just as they were sent before. How many times will they be sent again?

All my life, people in the Delta have suffered because of the oil industry. It is an industry that has enriched my material world. My life has been shaped by oil. Since 1965, demand for oil has increased by 150 per cent worldwide.⁶⁴ I have grown up with the blessings of oil – the benefits of a consumer society based on oil. I have travelled to five continents. I drive a car. I expect electricity, twenty-four hours a day. I expect heating in my children’s school. I expect to drink clean water.

My local Shell garage is open twenty-four hours a day, for motorists expect to be able to fill up, even at three o'clock in the morning. Shell's global reach means that every four seconds a plane is re-fuelled by Shell. Every four seconds some 1,200 cars visit a Shell service station. Yet in Bayelsa State, the source of 40 per cent of Nigeria's crude exports, there is just one petrol station. In Nigeria you might have to wait for hours, days or even weeks to fill up, as routine petrol shortages cripple the country. Nigeria may have vast reserves of oil, but for much of its history it has had to import petrol to feed its motorists.

Over my life, Shell has grown rich too, partly from the profits taken from Nigeria. So why should Nigerians be poor? More than 70 per cent of the population live in poverty.⁶⁵ The United Nations Development Programme admits that living conditions and the overall quality of life of most Nigerians have deteriorated during the same period as Nigeria's oil exports have grown.

'It is sobering that the average Nigerian today is worse off than 25 years ago, despite \$300 billion in oil revenues the country has generated since then,' says Malik Chaka, from the US House Africa Subcommittee.⁶⁶ Oil provides each Nigerian with an average of about 53 cents or 30 pence a year.⁶⁷ The proportion of population with access to safe drinking water is 57 per cent and with adequate sanitation 55.5 per cent. Life expectancy is only 51.8 years, and one child in five dies before the age of five.⁶⁸

Up to 3.8 million Nigerians have HIV/AIDS, and it is expected there will be nine million AIDS orphans by 2010. That is similar to the population of London. I try to imagine every commuter, shopper, office worker, every person on the tube and bus as an orphan. I try to picture everyone I see in that huge city as having no parents. I begin to understand the crisis of

Nigeria.⁶⁹ With its vast oil wealth, the country could have tackled the epidemic, but the cupboard is bare. All has been looted or wasted. Or it is in the bank accounts of City investors in London and Switzerland.

The vast majority of Nigeria's oil wealth has been exported to the benefit of Western oil companies and their shareholders. Those who have prospered in Nigeria have been the ruling elite. At the top of Nigeria, just as at the bottom, corruption is rife. Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has estimated that 45 per cent of the country's oil wealth has been wasted, stolen or siphoned off by corrupt officials.⁷⁰ That is nearly half. An estimated £220 billion was squandered, stolen or just wasted by Nigeria's rulers between Independence and 1999, when President Obasanjo came to power. And that is just a projected figure – the real figure may never be known.⁷¹

All my life they have had oil and I the blessing of a life driven by oil. But one person's blessing is another person's curse.

- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 T. Falola, A. Mahadi, M. Uhomobhi, U. Anyanwu (1991), *History of Nigeria* 3, Longman Nigeria, p. 79.
- 25 *Ibid.*
- 26 *Ibid.*, pp. 1–14; J.F. Frynas (2000), 'Oil In Nigeria', *Lit Verlag*, p. 9; W. Engdahl (2004), *A Century of War – Anglo-American Oil Politics And The New World Order*, Pluto, p. 25.
- 27 J.H. Bamberg (1994), *The History of the British Petroleum Company*, CUP, vol. 2, p. 119, p. 172; J.H. Bamberg (2000), *British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950–1975*, CUP, pp. 109–13.
- 28 D. Yergin (1991), *The Prize*, Simon & Schuster, pp. 269–71.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp. 271–9.
- 30 J.H. Bamberg (1994), *The History of the British Petroleum Company*, CUP, vol. 2, p. 119, p. 172.
- 31 J.H. Bamberg (2000), *British Petroleum and Global Oil 1950–1975*, CUP, pp. 109–13.
- 32 *Ibid.*
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 J. F. Frynas (2000), *Oil In Nigeria*, Lit Verlag, p. 12.
- 35 J. Bearman (2005), 'Shell Set to Rise Again With Nigerian Gas', *African Energy*, Issue 87, June, pp. 8–9.
- 36 Personal diary of Cyril Pyke, property of S. Marriott; Intelligence Department of the Colonial Secretary's Office, Southern Nigeria (1912), *Southern Nigeria Handbook 1912*, Waterlow, pp. 165–8.

Chapter 3: Crisis After Crisis

- 1 Quoted in K. Saro-Wiwa (1992), *Genocide in Nigeria – The Ogoni Tragedy*, Saros International, p. 71.
- 2 *African Concord* (1990), 'Oloibiri: In Limbo', 3 December, pp. 28–32.
- 3 A. Rowell (1996), *Green Backlash – Global Subversion of the Environment Movement*, Routledge, p. 291.
- 4 Environmental Rights Action & Climate Justice Programme (2005), *Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic Monstrosity*, June, p. 25.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
- 7 A. Edemariam (2005), 'The Boat is Sinking', *Guardian*, 15 June, G2, pp. 6–7.
- 8 J. Wilson (1970), Nigeria, 5 April, FCO 65/806

- 9 S. A. Khan (1994), *Nigeria – The Political Economy of Oil*, Oxford University Press, p. 5.
- 10 K. Maier (2000), *This House Has Fallen – Nigeria in Crisis*, pp. 123–5.
- 11 I. Okonta and O. Douglas (2001), *Where Vultures Feast – Shell, Human Rights and Oil in the Niger Delta*, Sierra Club Books, p. 21.
- 12 Prime Minister’s Personal Minute (1969), Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 29 July; FCO 67/212.
- 13 A. Sampson (1981), *The Seven Sisters – the Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped*, Coronet, p. 225; *Daily Telegraph* (2002), Obituary of Sir David Barran, 3 June.
- 14 M. Stewart (1969), Military Aid and Assistance for Nigeria, to Prime Minister, 4 August; FCO 67/212.
- 15 West Africa Department (1969), Biafran Attacks on Shell/BP Installations in Africa, 31 October; FCO 67/212.
- 16 Carless (1969), Correspondence to FCO, 26 May; FCO 67/212.
- 17 B. Barder (1969), Hand-written notes on Shell’s Operations in São Tomé, 5 June; FCO 67/212.
- 18 J. Wilson (1972), Re : Nigerian Oil, Letter to Sir Cyclic Pickard, Lagos, 16 March; FCO 65/1226.
- 19 From File FCO 65/806.
- 20 J. Wilson (1970), Nigeria, 5 April, FCO 65/806.
- 21 K. Saro-Wiwa (1992), *Genocide in Nigeria – The Ogoni Tragedy*, Saros International, pp. 63–4.
- 22 K. Saro-Wiwa (1995), *A Month and a Day*, Penguin, p. 53.
- 23 K. Saro-Wiwa (1992), *Genocide in Nigeria – The Ogoni Tragedy*, Saros International, pp. 44–57.
- 24 J. Spinks (1970), Oil Operations in Ogoni Division, Letter to HE Military Governor, Rivers State, 9 June.
- 25 Dere Youths Association (1970), *A Protest Presented to Representatives of the Shell BP Dev. Co. of Nig. Ltd. By the Dere Youths Association, Against the Company’s Lack of Interest in the Sufferings of Dere People Which Sufferings Are Causes As a Result of the Company’s Operations*, quoted in K. Saro-Wiwa (1992), *Genocide in Nigeria – The Ogoni Tragedy*, Saros International, pp. 64–6.
- 26 K. Saro-Wiwa (1992), *Genocide in Nigeria – The Ogoni Tragedy*, Saros International, pp. 80–1.
- 27 P.W. Heap (1970), Visit to Port Harcourt, 13–14 November; FCO 65/807.
- 28 A.C. Hunt (1970), Letter to H. J. Arbuthnett, Lagos, 4 September; FCO 65/807.
- 29 J. B. Johnston (1970), Letter to W. Wilson, 6 July; FCO 65/807.

- 30 Biography taken from Debrett's *People of Today*.
- 31 Royal Dutch/Shell (1970), British Policy in Africa – Implications for the commercial interests of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, 2 July, FCO 65/807.
- 32 Oil Department, FCO (1970), Record of Conversation Between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Managing Director of Shell, 27 July, FCO 65/807.
- 33 S.A. Khan (1994), *Nigeria – The Political Economy of Oil*, Oxford University Press, p. 22.
- 34 J. Wilson (1972), Call by Chairman of Shell on Secretary of State on 29 March, 28 March; FCO 65/1227/ 1228.
- 35 FCO (1972), Record of a Conversation Between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Sir David Barran, Chairman of Shell, FCO, 12 April.
- 36 P. Grattan (1972), Letter to Lord Bridges, 23 May; FCO (1972), Nigerian Oil, 23 May; PREM 15/595 and PREM 15/1836.
- 37 Lord Rothschild (1972), BP Note to Mr Armstrong, 30 May; PREM 15/595 and PREM 15/1836.
- 38 RTA (1972), Prime Minister, 31 May; PREM 15 / 595 and PREM 15/1836.
- 39 I. Okonta and O. Douglas (2001), *Where Vultures Feast – Shell, Human Rights and Oil in the Niger Delta*, Sierra Club Books, p. 55.
- 40 Environmental Rights Action (1995), *sHell in Iko – The Story of Double Standards*, 10 July; A. Rowell (1996), *Green Backlash – Global Subversion of the Environment Movement*, Routledge, pp. 294–5.
- 41 R. W. Tookey (1992) Letter to the Ecologist, 1 December; E. Nickson (1996) Letter to P. Brown and A. Rowell, 6 November
- 42 WAC Global Services (2003) *Peace and Security in the Niger Delta – Conflict Expert Group Baseline Report*, Working Paper for SPDC, December
- 43 J. R. Udofia (1990), Threat of Disruption of our Oil Operations at Umuechem by members of Umuechem Community, Letter to Commissioner of Police, 29 October.
- 44 Hon. O. Justice Inko-Tariah, Chief J. Ahiakwo; B. Alamina; Chief G. Amadi (1990), *Commission of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances of the Disturbances that Occurred at Umuechem in the Etche Government Area of Rivers State in the Federal Republic of Nigeria*.
- 45 R. Tookey (1993), Letter to Mrs Farmer Concerning Shell's Operations in Nigeria, 11 June.
- 46 E. Nickson (1996), Letter to Paul Brown and Andy Rowell, Shell International, 1996, 5 November.
- 47 Human Rights Watch/Africa (1995) *Nigeria – The Ogoni Crisis –*

- A Case Study of Military Repression in SouthEastern Nigeria*, Vol. 7, No. 5, pp. 10–11
- 48 Catma Films (1994), *The Drilling Fields*, Channel 4, 23 May; Amnesty International (1993), *Possible Extrajudicial Execution / Legal Concern*, 19 May; Unrepresented National and Peoples Organization (1993), *Developments in Ogoni, January–July 1993*, Nigeria, Office of the General Secretary, The Hague, 26 July; A. Rowell (1996), *Green Backlash – Global Subversion of The Environment Movement*, Routledge, p. 300.
 - 49 J.K. Tillery (1993), Re: Work Progress Up-Date Bomu Area TNP Contract No E-1C61: Letter for the Attention of Mr J.R. Udofia, 3 May.
 - 50 R. Boele (1995), Report of the UNPO Mission to Investigate the Situation of the Ogoni of Nigeria February 17–26, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, 1 May, p 18
 - 51 J.R. Udofia (1993), Disruption of Work on the 36" Rumueke-Bomu Trunkline: Letter to The Governor of Rivers State, 4 May.
 - 52 E. Nickson (1996), Letter to Paul Brown and Andy Rowell, 6 November.
 - 53 A. Rowell (1996), 'Shell Shock', *Listener Magazine*, 14 December, pp. 26–7; E. Nickson (1996), Letter to P. Brown and A. Rowell, 5 November.
 - 54 MOSOP (1993), Press Release, vol. 11/19, 27 October.
 - 55 E.U. Imomah (1993), Seizure of Fire Fighting Trucks by KoroKoro Community Taj / Eleme LGA, Letter to The Governor of Rivers State, 25th October.
 - 56 J.R. Udofia and E.U. Imomoh (1993), Seizure of Fire Fighting Trucks By KoroKoro Community in Taj/Eleme LGA, 26 October.
 - 57 P.B. Watts (1993), Letter to Alhaji Ibrahim Coommassie, Inspector General of Police, 1 December; V.A. Oteri (1994), Acquisition of Ammunition and Upgrade of Weapons, 19 January; V.A. Oteri (1994) Acquisition of Ammunition and Upgrade of Weapons, 17 August.
 - 58 T. Oladipo (1996), 'Ake Wants Shell Probed', *AM News*, 18 January; E. Mainah (1996), 'Nigeria Has Been Privatized, Prof. Ake Alleges', *This Day*, 19 January.
 - 59 A. Rowell (1996), *Green Backlash – Global Subversion of the Environment Movement*, Routledge, pp. 288–319.
 - 60 L. Mitee (2005), Interview with Andy Rowell, 29 June.
 - 61 S. Buerk (2005), Email to Andy Rowell, 11 July.
 - 62 K. Wiwa (2005), Interview with Andy Rowell and Lorne Stockman, 29 June.

- 63 *Reuters* (2005), Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 17 May.
- 64 A. Nikiforuk (2005), 'Eight Wrong Ways to Think About the Future of Energy; Mythology', *Canadian Business*, 17 January–30 January, p. 48; http://dRwww.shell.com/home/Framework?siteId=royal-en&FC2=/royal-en/html/iwgen/who_we_are/a_global_group/zzz_lhn.html&FC3=/royal-en/html/iwgen/who_we_are/a_global_group/a_global_group.html
- 65 *US Fed News* (2005), 'Energy Information Administration Issues Country Analysis Brief On Nigeria', 18 April.
- 66 <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Events/ev050803b.cfm>
- 67 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/g8/story/0,13365,1518719,00.html>
- 68 http://www.undp.org.ng/abnga_1.htm; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/g8/story/0,13365,1518719,00.html>
- 69 http://www.undp.org.ng/Docs/NHDR/Executive_Summary.pdf
- 70 *BBC News Online* (2005), 'Second Minister Sacked', 4 April; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4410109.stm>
- 71 D. Blair (2005), '£220 Billion – The Amount Stolen or Misused by Corrupt Nigerian Rules – £220 Billion – The Amount of Aid Donated by the West to Africa in 40 Years', *Daily Telegraph*, 25 June.

Chapter 4: An Intertwined Alliance

- 1 K. Saro-Wiwa (1992), *Genocide in Nigeria – The Ogoni Tragedy*, Saros International, p. 8.
- 2 The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (2005), *2004 People And The Environment Annual Report*, May.
- 3 BP (2004), *Energy Focus, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2004*, p. 4.
- 4 J. Bearman (2005), 'Shell Set to Rise Again With Nigerian Gas', *African Energy*, June, p. 8–9.
- 5 M. Enfield (2005), The Oil Industry in the Delta, PFC Energy, Presentation to the Conference on Nigeria's Delta Region, Meridian International Center, 15 February.
- 6 J. Bearman (2005), 'Shell Set to Rise Again With Nigerian Gas', *African Energy*, June, pp. 8–9; M. Enfield (2005), The Oil Industry in the Delta, PFC Energy, Presentation to the Conference on Nigeria's Delta Region, Meridian International Center, 15 February.
- 7 S. Buerk (2005), Email to Andy Rowell, 11 July.
- 8 M. Peel (2005), *Crisis in the Niger Delta: How Failures of Transparency and Accountability are Destroying the Region*, Chatham House, July, p.5.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 4.